We consider two-player non zero-sum infinite duration games played on weighted graphs. We extend the notion of secure equilibrium introduced by Chatterjee et al., from the Boolean setting to this quantitative setting. As for the Boolean setting, our notion of secure equilibrium refines the classical notion of Nash equilibrium. We prove that secure equilibria always exist in a large class of weighted games which includes common measures like sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf, mean-payoff, and discounted sum. Moreover we show that one can synthesize finite-memory strategy profiles with few memory. We also prove that the constrained existence problem for secure equilibria is decidable for sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf and mean-payoff measures. Our solutions rely on new results for zero-sum quantitative games with lexicographic objectives that are interesting on their own right.
Introduction
Two-player zero-sum infinite duration games played on graphs is a useful framework to formalize many important problems in computer science. System synthesis, and especially synthesis of reactive systems, is one of those important problems, see for example [20, 22] . In this application, the vertices and the edges of the graph represent the states and the transitions of the system; one player represents the system to synthesize, whereas the other represents the environment with which the system interacts. In the classical setting, the environment is considered as antagonist and the objectives of the two players are complementary, leading to a so-called zero-sum game. There are many known results about those zero-sum games [13, 14, 16, 18] .
Modeling the environment as completely adversarial is usually a bold abstraction of reality. However it is often used as it is simple and sound: a winning strategy against a completely adversarial model of the environment is winning against any environment which pursues its own objective. But this approach may fail to find a winning strategy whereas there exists a solution when the objective of the environment is taken into account. In this case, we need to consider the more general framework of non zero-sum games. The classical notion of rational behavior in this context is commonly formalized as Nash equilibria [19] . Nash equilibria capture rational behaviors when the players only care about their own payoff (internal criteria), and they are indifferent to the payoff of the other player (external criteria). In the setting of synthesis, the more appropriate notion is the adversarial external criteria, where the players are as harmful as possible to the other players without sabotaging their own objectives. This has inspired the study of refinements of Nash equilibria, like the notion of secure equilibria that captures the adversarial external criteria and is at the basis of compositional synthesis algorithms [9] . In secure equilibria, lexicographic objectives are considered: each player first tries to maximize his own payoff, and then tries to minimize the opponent's payoff. It is shown in [9] that secure equilibria are those Nash equilibria which represent enforceable contracts between the two players.
In this paper, we extend the notion of secure equilibria from the Boolean setting with ω-regular objectives of [9] to a quantitative setting where objectives are non necessarily ω-regular. More precisely, we consider two-player non zerosum turn-based games played on weighted graphs, called weighted games with objectives defined by classical measures considered in the literature for infinite plays: sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf, mean-payoff, and discounted sum [10] . In our setting, the edges of the weighted graph are labelled with pairs of rational values that are used to assign two values to each infinite play: one value models the reward of player 1, and the other the reward of player 2.
Contributions Our contributions are threefold. (1) We show that all weighted games with the classical measures have secure equilibria. We also establish that there exist simple profiles of strategies that witness such equilibria: finitememory strategies with a linear memory size are sufficient for most of the measures (polynomial size for inf and sup measures). (2) We provide polynomial or pseudo-polynomial (depending on the measures) algorithms for the automatic synthesis of such strategy profiles. We thus provide the necessary algorithms to extend the compositional synthesis framework of [8] to a quantitative setting. (3) We prove that one can decide the existence of a secure equilibrium whose outcome satisfies some constraints, for all measures except the discounted sum. In the latter case, we show that this problem is connected to a challenging open problem [3, 11] . Our solutions rely on the analysis of two-player zero-sum games with lexicographic objectives (for all the measures) for which we provide worst-case optimal algorithms. These so-called lexicographic games are interesting on their own right and, to the best of our knowledge, were not studied in the literature.
Related work Secure equilibria were first introduced in [9] in a Boolean setting, and for ω-regular objectives. We extend this work to a quantitative setting in which objectives are not necessarily ω-regular. Our contributions (1) and (2) are very much inspired by a recent work by Brihaye et al. [6] that provides general results for the existence of Nash equilibria in a large class of multi-player weighted graphs. We show that their main theorem is extendable to secure equilibria in the case of two-player games. However, to adapt their theorem we need non trivial new results on lexicographic games, while for Nash equilibria they can rely on well-known results for (non lexicographic) zero-sum two-player games. Previously to [6] , existence results about different kinds of equilibria (Nash, secure, perfect, and subgame perfect) have been established for quantitative reachability objectives in multi-player weighted games [4, 5, 17] . In [23] , among other results, the authors study the decision problem of both the existence and the constraint existence of Nash equilibria in multi-player weighted games for the meanpayoff measure. A part of our contribution (3) is inspired by some of their techniques. The rational synthesis problem is studied in [15] , when a system interacts with agents that all have their own objectives. This problem asks to construct a strategy profile that enforces the objective of the system, and which is an equilibrium for the agents. The objectives are ω-regular or defined by deterministic latticed Büchi word automata (they do not include mean-payoff and discounted sum objectives), and secure equilibria are not considered explicitly. Lexicographic games were first considered in [2] , for a mean-payoff measure that differs from the one studied in this paper. The proof technique that we develop is similar to their approach but requires non trivial adaptations. To the best of our knowledge, lexicographic games for all the other objectives (sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf, and discounted sum) have not been studied previously.
Structure of the paper In Section 2, we first recall classical notions on games and equilibria, we then introduce the three problems studied in this paper and our solutions for the sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf, mean-payoff, and discounted sum measures (Problems 1-3 and Theorems 1-3). In Section 3, for each of the three problems, we provide a general framework of weighted games in which the problem can be solved (Propositions 1-3). Those frameworks impose in particular the determinacy of two (one for each player) lexicographic games associated with the initial game. Lexicographic games are introduced in Section 3 and proved to be determined in Section 4, where their complexity is also established. With these results, in Section 3, we are able to prove Theorems 1-2, because games with the considered measures all fall in the frameworks proposed for solving Problems 1-2. The framework proposed for the last problem requires an additional hypothesis that we study in Section 5. Theorem 3 can then be derived for all the measures, except the discounted sum. We also show that Problem 3 for this measure is linked to a challenging open problem [3, 11] . In Section 6, we give a conclusion. Due to lack of space, some proofs are just sketched or omitted (see [7] for a full version of the paper).
Weighted Games and Studied Problems
In this section, we recall the notions of weighted game, Nash equilibrium, secure equilibrium, and we state the problems that we want to solve.
Weighted Games
We consider two-player turn-based non zero-sum weighted games with weights seen as rewards. The two players want to maximize their payoff (this payoff is computed from the weights, for example as in Definition 2).
Definition 1.
A two-player non zero-sum weighted game is a tuple G = (V, V1, V2, E, r, Payoff) where
is a finite directed graph, the arena of the game, with vertices V and edges E ⊆ V × V , such that ∀v ∈ V, ∃v ∈ V : e = (v, v ) ∈ E (no deadlock), • V1, V2 form a partition of V such that Vi is the set of vertices controlled by player i ∈ {1, 2}, • r = (r1, r2) is the weight function such that ri : E → Q associates a rational reward with each edge for player i, Payoff 2 ) is the payoff function where Payoff i : V ω → R is the payoff function of player i such that Payoff i is defined starting from ri.
When an initial vertex v0 ∈ V is fixed, we call (G, v0) an initialized weighted game. A play of (G, v0) is an infinite sequence ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ V ω such that ρ0 = v0 and (ρi, ρi+1) ∈ E for all i ∈ N. Histories of (G, v0) are finite sequences h = h0 . . . hn ∈ V + defined in the same way. A prefix (resp. suffix ) of a play ρ is a finite sequence ρ0 . . . ρn (resp. infinite sequence ρnρn+1 . . .) denoted by ρ ≤n (resp. ρ ≥n ). The length of ρ ≤n is the number n of its edges. For a play ρ ∈ V ω and a player i ∈ {1, 2}, we denote by ri(ρ) = ri(ρ0, ρ1)ri(ρ1, ρ2) . . . the sequence of player i weights along ρ. The payoff of ρ for player i is given by Payoff i (ρ), and Payoff(ρ) = (Payoff 1 (ρ), Payoff 2 (ρ)) is the payoff of ρ in G.
A strategy σ for player i ∈ {1, 2} is a function σ :
We denote by Σi the set of strategies of player i. A strategy σ for player i is positional if σ(h) = σ(h ) for all histories h, h ending with the same vertex (σ only depends on the last vertex of the history). In particular, a positional strategy is a function σ : Vi → V (instead of σ : V * Vi → V ). A strategy σ is a finite-memory strategy if it needs only finite memory of the history (recorded by a finite strategy automaton).
Given a strategy σ ∈ Σi with i ∈ {1, 2}, we say that a play ρ of G is consistent with σ if ρ k+1 = σ(ρ ≤k ) for all k ∈ N such that ρ k ∈ Vi. A strategy profile of G is a pair (σ1, σ2) of strategies, with σi ∈ Σi for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Given an initial vertex v0, such a strategy profile determines a unique play of (G, v0) that is consistent with both strategies. This play is called the outcome of (σ1, σ2) and is denoted by σ1, σ2 v 0 . For a history hv ∈ V * V , and a strategy profile (σ1, σ2), we denote by σ1| h , σ2 v the outcome of (σ1| h , σ2) in the initialized game (G, v) , where σ1| h is the strategy defined by σ1| h (h v ) = σ1(hh v ) for all histories h v ∈ V * V1 that begin with v. The outcome σ1, σ2| h v is defined similarly. A player deviates from a strategy (resp. from a play) if he does not carefully follow this strategy (resp. play). We say that a strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is a positional (resp. finitememory) strategy profile if σ1 and σ2 are positional (resp. finite-memory) strategies.
In this paper, we focus on several well-known payoff functions (see for instance [10] ).
Definition 2. Given a weighted game G = (V, V1, V2, E, r, Payoff), we define the payoff function Payoff as one of the measures in {Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, InfMP, SupMP, Disc λ for λ ∈ ]0, 1[}, where for all i ∈ {1, 2} and ρ ∈ V ω :
• Infi(ρ) = inf n∈N ri(ρn, ρn+1),
We also call these games Payoff weighted games.
Equilibria
We now recall the concept of Nash equilibrium and secure equilibrium. In this aim we need to fix two lexicographic orders on R 2 : a lexicographic order 1 w.r.t. the first component and a lexicographic order 2 w.r.t. the second component such that for all (x1, x2),
Notice that (R 2 , 1) and (R 2 , 2) are totally ordered sets. A strategy profile (σ1, σ2) in an initialized weighted game (G, v0) is a Nash equilibrium if player 1 (resp. player 2) has no incentive to deviate unilaterally from σ1 (resp. σ2), since he cannot strictly increase his payoff when using σ 1 (resp. σ 2 ) instead of σ1 (resp. σ2). The notion of secure equilibrium is stronger in the sense that player i has no incentive to deviate from σi with respect to the order i (instead of the usual order ≤ on his payoffs).
Definition 3. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game. A strategy profile (σ1, σ2) with σi ∈ Σi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is a Nash equilibrium in (G, v0) if, for each strategy σ i ∈ Σi, i ∈ {1, 2},
It is a secure equilibrium in (G, v0) if, for each strategy
Note that the notion of secure equilibrium is a refinement of that of Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, each player only cares about his own payoff (he maximizes it), whereas in a secure equilibrium, he cares about the payoff of both players (he maximizes his payoff and then minimizes the payoff of the other player).
With the notation of Definition 3, σ 1 is called a profitable deviation for player 1 w.r.t. (σ1, σ2) if we have Payoff 1 ( σ1, σ2 v 0 ) < (resp. ≺1) Payoff 1 ( σ 1 , σ2 v 0 ). Profitable deviations for player 2 are defined similarly. With these terms, we can say that (σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium (resp. secure equilibrium) if no player has a profitable deviation w.r.t. (σ1, σ2) for the relation < (resp. ≺i).
Example 1. Consider the initialized InfMP weighted game (G, v0) depicted in Figure 1 . Circle (resp. square) vertices are player 1 (resp. player 2) vertices, and the weights (0, 0) are not specified. In this game, both players have two positional strategies, respectively denoted by σi and σ i for each player i. These strategies are depicted in Figure 1 . The strategy profiles (σ1, σ 2 ) and (σ 1 , σ2) are secure equilibria in (G, v0). Indeed, for the first one, only player 1 has control on the play σ1, σ 2 v 0 with payoff (4, 4), and he decreases his payoff if he plays strategy σ 1 instead of σ1 ((3, 2) ≺1 (4, 4)). For the second one, both players have control on the play σ 1 , σ2 v 0 with payoff (4, 3). If player 1 plays σ1 instead of σ 1 , he keeps the same payoff but increases the payoff of player 2 ((4, 4) ≺1 (4, 3)). If player 2 plays σ 2 instead of σ2, he decreases his payoff ((3, 2) ≺2 (4, 3)). Hence in both examples no player has a profitable deviation, and these strategy profiles are secure equilibria (and thus Nash equilibria) in (G, v0). However the strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium which is not a secure equilibrium. Indeed, σ 1 is a profitable deviation for player 1 since by playing σ 1 instead of σ1, he keeps his own payoff but can decrease the payoff of player 2. Finally, the strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is neither a secure equilibrium nor a Nash equilibrium.
Problems and Main Theorems
To conclude Section 2, we state the three problems studied in the paper and our results. Let (G, v0) be an initialized two-player non zero-sum weighted game. Problem 2. What is the complexity of constructing a (finite-memory) secure equilibrium in (G, v0) if one exists?
2 , is it decidable whether there exists a secure equilibrium (σ1, σ2)
As expected, if no restriction is given on the payoff function used in weighted games, the answer to Problem 1 is negative. An example of a weighted game with no Nash equilibrium (and thus with no secure equilibrium) is given in [6] . In this paper, we solve the stated problems for weighted games with the payoff functions given in Definition 2. Our solutions are as follows (see also Tables 1-2): Theorem 1. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game. Then (G, v0) has a secure equilibrium with memory size 1 bounded by |V | + 2 (resp. |V | · |E| 2 + 3) for payoff functions InfMP, SupMP, LimInf, LimSup and Disc λ (resp. Inf and Sup).
Theorem 2. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game. Then one can compute a finite-memory secure equilibrium in (G, v0) in pseudo-polynomial time (resp. polynomial time) for payoff functions InfMP, SupMP and Disc λ (resp. LimInf, LimSup, Inf and Sup).
Theorem 3. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game and µ, ν ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞}) 2 be two thresholds. Then one can decide in NP ∩ co-NP (resp. in P) whether there exists a secure equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in (G, v0) such that µ ≤ Payoff( σ1, σ2 v 0 ) ≤ ν for payoff functions InfMP and SupMP (resp. LimInf, LimSup, Inf and Sup). 
Memory size Construction time
InfMP, SupMP |V | + 2 pseudo-polynomial LimInf, LimSup |V | + 2 polynomial Inf, Sup |V | · |E| 2 + 3 polynomial Disc λ |V | + 2 pseudo-polynomial
Lexicographic Payoff Games and Equilibria
To solve Problems 1-3, we follow the approach proposed in [6] to solve the first problem for Nash (instead of secure) equilibria. The general idea is the following one. Given an initialized (non zero-sum) weighted game (G, v0), we derive two well-chosen two-player (zero-sum) games G 1 and G 2 , and under adequate hypotheses, we obtain properties about secure equilibria in (G, v0) through determinacy results and characterization of the optimal strategies of G 1 and G 2 . In this section, we first introduce the games G 1 and G 2 . Then for each studied problem, we propose a general framework (i.e. adequate general hypotheses on (G, v0), G 1 and G
2 ) under which we are able to solve it (Propositions 1-3). Later in Sections 4-5, we prove that these hypotheses are satisfied for most of the weighted games with the payoff functions of Definition 2. We will thus be able to prove Theorems 1-3 as a consequence of Propositions 1-3.
Lexicographic Payoff Games
Let G be a weighted game as in Definition 1. We associate with G two zero-sum games G 1 and G 2 , one for each player, that are respectively equipped with the lexicographic order 1 and 2 used to compare payoffs of these games. Definition 4. From a weighted game G = (V, V1, V2, E, r, Payoff) as in Definition 1, we derive a zero-sum lexicographic payoff game G 1 of the form (V, V1, V2, E, r, Payoff, 1).
In the zero-sum game G 1 , the two players have antagonistic goals. For each play ρ ∈ V ω , player 1 receives the payoff Payoff(ρ) that he wants to maximize w.r.t. the lexicographic order 1, while player 2 pays the cost Payoff(ρ) that he wants to minimize w.r.t. 1. When Payoff is one among the payoff functions of Definition 2, we say that G 1 is a Payoff lexicographic payoff game.
We also consider a dual lexicographic payoff game G 2 = (V, V2, V1, E, r, Payoff, 2) where the roles of the two players are exchanged and the used lexicographic order is 2. In this game player 2 wants to maximize Payoff(ρ) w.r.t. 2, while player 1 wants to minimize it.
Given a lexicographic payoff game G 1 , we define for every vertex v ∈ V , the upper value Val(v) = infσ 2 ∈Σ 2 sup σ 1 ∈Σ 1 Payoff( σ1, σ2 v ), and the lower value
We also say that G 1 has a value from v, and we write Val(v) = Val(v) = Val(v). Moreover, we say that σ 1 ∈ Σ1 is an optimal strategy for player 1 and vertex v if, for each strategy σ2 ∈ Σ2, we have Val(v) 1 Payoff( σ 1 , σ2 v ). Similarly, σ 2 ∈ Σ2 is an optimal strategy for player 2 and vertex v if, for each strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1, we have Payoff( σ1, σ 2 v ) 1 Val(v). Finally, we say that G 1 is positionally-determined if it is determined and has positional optimal strategies for both players and all vertices. Additionally, we say that G 1 is uniformly-determined if the positional optimal strategies σ 1 , σ 2 can be chosen globally independently of vertex v. We call these strategies uniform.
The next properties are other important ingredients to solve Problems 1-3.
Definition 5 ([6]
). Let G = (V, V1, V2, E, r, Payoff) be a weighted game. The payoff function Payoff i , i ∈ {1, 2}, is prefix-linear in G if, for every vertex v ∈ V and history hv ∈ V + , there exists a ∈ R and b ∈ R + such that, for every play ρ ∈ V ω whose first vertex is v, we have :
Moreover, Payoff i is prefix-independent if Payoff i (hρ) = Payoff i (ρ).
Remark 1.
Clearly the two components of the payoff functions LimInf, LimSup, InfMP and SupMP are prefixindependent. For payoff function Disc λ , the components are not prefix-independent but rather prefix-linear (see [6] ). Finally it is easy to see that neither Inf nor Sup functions have prefix-linear components.
Existence of Secure Equilibria
We can now state the general framework under which Problem 1 is positively solved. It is composed of all initialized weighted games (G, v0) such that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, lexicographic payoff games G i are uniformly-determined, and payoff functions Payoff i are prefix-linear.
This proposition is an adaptation to secure equilibria in two-player games of a theorem 3 given in [6, 12] for the existence of Nash equilibria in multi-player games. The main difference is that we here need to work with (twodimensional) lexicographic payoff games instead of classical (one-dimensional, non lexicographic) zero-sum quantitative games. The proof of this proposition is similar to the one given in [6, 12] . Let σ 1 (resp. σ −1 ) be a uniform optimal strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2) in G 1 , and similarly let σ 2 (resp. σ −2 ) in G 2 . The secure equilibrium in (G,
4
Notice that we could prove a result similar to Proposition 1 such that the hypotheses are replaced by the following ones: (G, v0) is an initialized weighted game such that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, G i is determined (less restrictive than uniformly-determined) and Payoff i is prefix-independent (more restrictive than prefix-linear). The same kind of result is proved in [12] in the case of Nash equilibria; its proof can be easily adapted to the case of secure equilibria as done for the proof of Proposition 1.
Construction of Secure Equilibria
We have proposed a general framework to solve Problem 1: a finite-memory secure equilibrium can be constructed from the uniform optimal strategies in G 1 and G 2 . Hence, under the additional hypothesis that one can compute those strategies, Problem 2 is also solved. Proposition 2. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game such that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, Payoff i is prefix-linear, and G i is uniformly-determined with computable uniform optimal strategies. If such strategies can be computed in C time for both players, then a finite-memory secure equilibrium in (G, v0) can also be constructed in C time.
Constrained Existence of Secure Equilibria
Let us turn to Problem 3. First notice that contrarily to Problem 2, strategy profiles for solving this problem require infinite memory, as shown by Example 2.
Example 2. Consider the initialized InfMP weighted game (G, v0) of Figure 2 . Take thresholds µ = (1, 1) and ν = (+∞, +∞).
As explained in [24, Proof of Lemma 7] , any strategy profile that is finite-memory produces an ultimately periodic 
Let us define a strategy profile (σ1, σ2) such that its outcome is equal to ρ * , and as soon as one player deviates from ρ * , the other player punishes him by always chosing an edge with weights (0, 0). This strategy profile is a secure equilibrium since one verifies that the player who first deviates receives a payoff of 0 instead of 1.
Therefore there exists a secure equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in (G, v0) that satisfies µ ≤ Payoff( σ1, σ2 v 0 ) ≤ ν, but it cannot be finite-memory.
Let us now show that Problem 3 is decidable in the same framework as for Problem 1, with the additional hypotheses that one can compute values in G i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, and the next problem is decidable. Let µ, ν ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞}) 2 be two thresholds. Is it decidable whether there exists an infinite path ρ in G starting in v0 such that
Proposition 3. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game and µ, ν ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞}) 2 be two thresholds. Suppose that
• for each i ∈ {1, 2}, Payoff i is prefix-linear, and G i is uniformly-determined with computable values, • Problem 4 is decidable for the graph G constructed from G such that both functions Val i , i ∈ {1, 2}, are constructed from the values
One can decide whether there exists a secure equilibrium
The justification is based on the next lemma that characterizes the outcomes of secure equilibria. Lemma 1. Let ρ be a play in a weighted game (G, v0). Then ρ is the outcome of a secure equilibrium in (G, v0) iff
Indeed, an algorithm for Problem 3 is as follows. 
Determinacy of Lexicographic Games
In Section 3, we have established strong links between secure equilibria in weighted games (G, v0) and determinacy of the two games G 1 , G 2 . We have shown how to solve Problems 1-3 under some general hypotheses (see Proposition 1-3). In this section, we study the determinacy of lexicographic payoff games for the payoff functions of Definition 2. We show that these games are uniformly-determined, except for the Inf and Sup payoffs for which they are only positionally-determined. We also study the complexity of computing values and optimal strategies for these games. Besides being important ingredients to solve Problems 1-3, these results are also very interesting on their own right. Our results are the following ones (we state them only for G 1 ) (see also Figure 3 . This game is positionally-determined, each vertex has value (2, 0) except vertex v4 that has value (3, 1). Let us show that it is not uniformly-determined. To guarantee value (2, 0) for v0, player 1 has to use the positional strategy σ 1 such that σ 1 (v4) = v3. Indeed, this is the only way to have (2, 0) 1 Inf( σ 1 , σ2 v 0 ) for all strategy σ2 of player 2. However, with this strategy, player 1 cannot guarantee value (3, 1) for v4. Before giving the proofs of Theorems 4-5, notice that we are now able to prove Theorems 1-2 for the payoff functions InfMP, SupMP, LimInf, LimSup and Disc λ . Indeed the hypotheses of Propositions 1-2 are satisfied as the two components of these payoff functions are prefix-linear (see Remark 1) and the games G i , i ∈ {1, 2}, are uniformlydetermined with computable uniform optimal strategies (see .
For Inf and Sup payoffs, the proof of Theorem 1 cannot be based on Proposition 1 since none of its hypotheses is satisfied. Indeed, the payoff function Inf is not prefix-linear (see Remark 1), and there exist Inf lexicographic payoff games that are not uniformly-determined (see Example 3). However we get Theorems 1-2 for Inf (resp. Sup) payoffs thanks to a polynomial reduction to LimInf (resp. LimSup) payoffs 6 and the fact that Theorems 1-2 hold for the latter payoffs.
In the next subsections, we prove Theorems 4-5 for the payoff functions InfMP and Disc λ only. Proofs for SupMP payoff are adaptations of proofs for InfMP payoff, and proofs for the other payoffs are based on adequate reductions to classical ω-regular games.
InfMP Lexicographic Payoff Games
Theorems 4-5 for InfMP payoffs are non trivial extensions to dimension 2 of well-known results about (one-dimensional) mean-payoff games [13, 25] . In [2] , similar results are proved for a class of games called lexicographic mean-payoff games. It should be noted that this class is different from our class of InfMP lexicographic payoff games. Indeed, the authors use a lexicographic order 1 on R 2 different from ours:
, and most importantly the payoff of a play ρ is computed as lim inf ρ k+1 ) ) at the level of twodimensional vectors and with the lim inf using order 1 (whereas we proceed component wise). An example showing that the two definitions are not equivalent is given in [2] 7 . The proof that we propose for Theorem 4 is inspired from the proof given in [2] , however with several non trivial adaptations. Before giving it, let us first make a remark and introduce some useful notions.
Remark 2.
With an adequate shifting of the weights, we can assume w.l.o.g. that G 1 is a lexicographic payoff game with a weight function r with ri : E → N (instead of ri : E → Q) for each i ∈ {1, 2}.
Let us briefly recall the two well-known classes of meanpayoff games and finite cycle-forming games [1, 13, 25] . Mean-payoff games are games as in Definition 4 except that functions r and Payoff = InfMP are one-dimensional (instead of two-dimensional). The comparison of two payoffs is thus done with usual order ≤ instead of 1. It is a classical result that mean-payoff games are uniformly-determined. Meanpayoff games are usually studied by considering the finite duration versions of these games, such that a play is stopped as soon as some vertex is repeated. More precisely, the arena of a finite cycle-forming game F is a finite directed graph (V, E) such that the vertices are partionned into V1 and V2, and the edges are labeled by weights in Q. The game starts in some initial vertex v0, and players play in a turn-based manner until some vertex v is visited for the second time. At this point, the game stops, a history hc called F-play, has been constructed by both players with c a cycle from v determinacy (α, β) Table 3 . Obtained results for lexicographic games (see to v. A payoff is then associated with hc depending on the edge weights of cycle c. As for lexicographic payoff games, the notions of value and optimal strategies can be defined for mean-payoff games and finite cycle-forming games. The next proposition is proved in [1, Section 7.2].
Proposition 4. A finite cycle-forming game F such that the payoff of an F-play depends only on the vertices that appear in the formed cycle (modulo cyclic permutations) is uniformly-determined.
In the sequel we also need the next lemma about the cycle decomposition of an infinite path in an arena (V, E). Given a path ρ, we consider its cycle decomposition into a multiset of simple cycles as follows. 8 We push successively vertices ρ0, ρ1, . . . onto a stack. Whenever we push a vertex ρm equal to a vertex ρn in the stack (i.e. a simple cycle ρn . . . ρm is formed), we remove it from the stack (i.e. we remove all the vertices above ρn, but not ρn) and add it to the cycle decomposition multiset of ρ. Notice that at any moment, the stack contains the vertices of a simple path, thus at most |V | vertices.
Lemma 2. Let (V, E) be an arena. For each infinite path ρ in (V, E) and its cycle decomposition, the next properties hold. Let F be a finite cycle-forming game with arena (V, E). If c is a cycle in the cycle decomposition multiset of ρ, then c appears in an F-play hc in the game F, for some history h starting in ρ0 and composed of edges of ρ.
Let us now proceed with the proof of Theorem 4 for InfMP payoff. Let G 1 = (V, V1, V2, E, r, InfMP, 1) be an InfMP lexicographic payoff game with natural weights (see Remark 2). For each i ∈ {1, 2}, we denote by |ri| = max{ri(e) | e ∈ E} the maximal weight for component i, and by |R| = max {|r1|, |r2|} the maximal weight of the game.
We derive from G 1 a mean-payoff game M = (V, V1, V2, E, r1, InfMP1) such that the weights are limited to the first component r1 of r. As such a game is uniformlydetermined [13, 25] , each vertex v has a value Val(v) in M. Notice that it is not possible for player 1 to move to a vertex with a higher value, and player 1 will never choose to move to a vertex with a lower value. Similarly, player 2 cannot move to a vertex with a lower value and will never decide to move to a vertex with a higher value.
Thus, for each value l, we can consider the subarena 9 of (V, E) restricted to V l being the set of all vertices v ∈ V such that Val(v) = l. We denote by G (resp. Property (3)). Recall that n − J1(n) − J2(n) ≤ |V | by definition of the cycle decomposition. First observe that 0 ≤ lim infn→∞
, 2}, and limn→∞
. We have either κ > 0 or κ = 0. Using standard additive properties of lim inf and lim sup (see for instance [10, Lemma 3] 
We can now prove that (l, β) 1 InfMP(ρ). This will show that strategy τ 1 ensures at least value (l, β) from vertex v in G
1
[l] against any strategy of player 2.
In this case we thus also have (l, β) 1 InfMP(ρ).
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof (of Theorem 4 with InfMP payoff ). Let G 1 be an InfMP lexicographic payoff game. By Lemma 4, the lexicographic subgame G
[l] is uniformly-determined, for each value l. Let σ 1 [l] (resp. σ 2 [l]) be a uniform optimal strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2) in G 1 [l] . We construct a uniform strategy σ 1 (resp. σ 2 ) of player 1 (resp. player 2) such that its restriction to V l is equal to σ 1 [l] (resp. σ 2 [l]). These strategies are well-defined since the different sets V l form a partition of V . Let us prove that the values in game G 1 are the same as in the subgames G 1 [l] and that strategies σ 1 , σ 2 are optimal. We only give the proof for player 1 (it is similar for player 2).
Let σ2 be any strategy of player 2. Let v ∈ V be such that its value in M is Val(v) = l and its value in F l is β l (v) = β. By Lemma 4, its value in G
[l] is equal to (l, β). Let us show that (l, β) 1 InfMP(ρ) with ρ = σ 1 , σ2 v .
Clearly, play ρ eventually stays inside some set V L such that L ≥ l since there is a finite number of such sets. Indeed, by definition of σ 1 , only player 2 can force the play to leave V l 1 to go to another V l 2 , and only for values l2 > l1. Suppose first that L = l, i.e., the whole play ρ stays in V l . Then by Lemma 4, we get (l, β) 1 InfMP(ρ). Suppose now that L > l, and let n > 0 such that ρ = ρ ≥n ∈ (V L ) ω . As the function InfMP is prefix-independent, InfMP(ρ ) = InfMP(ρ), and we can limit our study to ρ . By definition of σ 1 and Lemma 4, we have (
Finally, the proof of Theorem 5 for InfMP payoff is inspired by a proof given in [2] : it uses a reduction of InfMP lexicographic payoff games to mean-payoff games for optimal strategies, and then applies classical results on mean-payoff games [13, 25] .
Disc λ Lexicographic Payoff Games
The proof of Theorem 4 for Disc λ lexicographic payoff games follows from the next simple idea: player 1 first tries to maximize his payoff limited to the first component and then to minimize his payoff limited to the second component. He can use a uniform strategy to achieve this goal because at each step, the game reduces to a classical one-dimensional discounted game [25] known to be uniformly-determined. Moreover computing the value of the vertices in a discounted game is in NP ∩ co-NP [25] .
Let us now go into the details. The proof of Theorem 4 for Disc λ payoff will be obtained as a consequence of Lemmas 5-6 given below.
Let λ ∈ ]0, 1[ and G 1 be a Disc λ lexicographic payoff game. We derive from G 1 the discounted game D = (V, V1, V2, E, r1, Disc λ 1 ) such that the weights are limited to the first component r1 of r, and player 1 wants to maximize the payoff Disc λ 1 while player 2 wants to minimize it. By [25] , this game is uniformly-determined, and the value of each vertex v ∈ V and uniform strategies can be defined by the following system of equations:
(4) We denote by E the set of all optimal edges of E, i.e. edges realizing the maximum (resp. minimum) for player 1 (resp. player 2) in system (4).
The next lemma states that against an optimal strategy of player 1 in D, player 2 should rather choose edges in E .
Lemma 5. 1. Let σ 1 be a uniform optimal strategy of player 1 in D, and let σ2 be a strategy of player 2 in D. Let v be a vertex in V with value
Similarly let σ 2 be a uniform optimal strategy of player 2, and σ1 be a strategy of player 1. If ρ = σ1, σ 2 v contains two vertices ρ l , ρ l+1 with (ρ l , ρ l+1 ) ∈ E \ E , then Disc
Proof. We only give the proof for the first statement, the proof being similar for the second one. Notice that player 1 only uses edges in E . Suppose that player 2 follows a strategy σ2 such that ρ = σ 1 , σ2 v uses at least one edge in E \ E . We consider the smallest index l ≥ 0 such that ρ l ∈ V2 and (ρ l , ρ l+1 ) ∈ E \ E .
On one hand, by (4), we have Val
On the other hand, by optimality of σ 1 , we have that Disc
Then by definition of l, we have Disc
. By this last inequality and ( * ), we can conclude that Disc
We have shown that if both players play optimally in D, then the produced outcome uses edges of E only. We now consider the discounted game D = (V, V1, V2, E , r2, Disc λ 2 ) such that the edges are limited to E and the weight function is now r2. Another difference is that player 1 wants to minimize his payoff (now seen as a cost) while player 2 wants to maximize it.
The following lemma describes values and optimal strategies of the lexicographic payoff game G 1 in relation with the ones of discounted games D and D . Theorem 4 for Disc λ payoff is a consequence of this lemma.
Proof. Let τ 1 be a uniform optimal strategy for player 1 in D , and σ2 be a strategy of player 2 in
We are going to show that (Val(v), β(v)) 1 Disc λ (ρ). As τ 1 is a strategy in D , it is an optimal strategy in D. Therefore Disc 
Finally, the proof of Theorem 5 for Disc λ payoff is obtained by using classical complexity results on the discounted games D and D [25] .
Study of Problems 3 and 4
The aim of this section is to prove Theorem 3 about the constrained existence of a secure equilibrium in such games (see Problem 3). Thanks to Proposition 3 that provides a general framework for solving Problem 3, in view of the results of Section 4, it remains to study Problem 4 about the constraint existence of a path in a graph with weights and values. Hence we first study the latter problem. We then derive a proof of Theorem 3 for InfMP, SupMP, LimInf, LimSup, Inf and Sup payoffs. We leave the discounted case open. However we show that a solution in this case would provide a solution to an open problem mentioned in [11] itself related to other difficult open problems in mathematics [3] .
Solution for Problem 4
Problem 4 is decidable for InfMP, SupMP, LimInf and LimSup payoffs. The approach that we develop is inspired by proof techniques proposed in [23] for InfMP payoff.
Theorem 6. Let G = (V, E, v0, r, Val) be a finite directed graph with an initial vertex v0, a weight function r, and a value function Val. Let µ, ν ∈ (Q∪{±∞}) 2 be two thresholds. Then for Payoff = InfMP, SupMP, LimInf and LimSup, one can decide in polynomial time whether there exists an infinite path ρ in G such that ∀k ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Val i (ρ k ) i Payoff(ρ ≥k ), and µ ≤ Payoff(ρ) ≤ ν.
Since each Payoff i is prefix-independent in Theorem 6 (see Remark 1), condition
can be replaced by the simpler condition
Hence, it is possible to get a proof of Theorem 6 with the next lemma.
Lemma 7. One can decide in polynomial time whether there exists an infinite path ρ in G such that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, µi ∼i Payoff i (ρ) ∼ i νi with ∼i, ∼ i ∈ {<, ≤}.
We now have the required material to prove Theorem 3 for all the payoffs except Disc λ payoff. We begin with InfMP, SupMP, LimInf and LimSup payoffs (since Inf and Sup payoffs require a separate proof). An algorithm to solve Problem 3 consists in: (1) computing Val i (v) for each vertex v of G i , i ∈ {1, 2}; (2) constructing from (G, v0) the graph G = (V, E, v0, r, Val); and (3) applying the algorithm of Theorem 6. For each payoff InfMP, SupMP, LimInf and LimSup, steps (2)-(3) can be done in polynomial time by Theorem 6. For LimInf and LimSup payoffs, step (1) can also be done in polynomial time by Theorem 5. One can prove that it is in NP ∩ co-NP for InfMP and SupMP payoffs.
For Inf and Sup payoffs, Theorem 3 is proved thanks to the same reduction to LimInf and LimSup weighted games, as done for the proof of Theorems 1-2.
Particular Case of Disc λ Payoff
In this section, we consider Disc λ weighted games. We are going to show that Problem 3 for these games is related to the next problem whose decidability is unknown [11] . Moreover the latter problem is related to other hard open problems in diverse mathematical fields according to [3] .
Problem 5. Given three rational numbers a, b and t, and a rational discount factor λ ∈ ]0, 1[, does there exist an infinite sequence w = w0w1 . . . ∈ {a, b} ω such that ∞ k=0 w k λ k is equal to t?
Let us provide the next reduction of Problem 5 to Problem 3 for Disc λ payoff. Let a, b, t ∈ Q and a rational factor λ ∈ ]0, 1[. We consider the Disc λ weighted game (G a,b , v0) played on the arena depicted in Figure 4 , where c is a rational number such that c > max {|a|, |b|}. 13 We also consider the thresholds µ = ((1−λ)·t, −(1−λ)·t) and ν = (+∞, +∞). Notice that threshold ν imposes no constraint. We want to show the next proposition:
Proposition 5. There exists a sequence w ∈ {a, b} ω such that ∞ k=0 w k λ k = t iff there exists a secure equilibrium in (G a,b , v0) with outcome ρ such that µ ≤ Disc λ (ρ) ≤ ν.
We need the next lemma where A denotes the subarena of G a,b restricted to the set of vertices {v0, v1}. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied Problems 1-3 about secure equilibria in two-player weighted games, and proposed three general frameworks in which we can solve them. We have proved that weighted games with a classical payoff function like InfMP, SupMP, LimInf, LimSup, Inf, Sup and Disc λ , all fall in these frameworks, except the Disc λ payoff for Problem 3 (see Tables 1-2 ). We have shown that this particular problem is linked to another open problem [3, 11] .
Our approach was inspired by the recent work [6] that states the existence of Nash equilibria in a large class of multi-player weighted games. As in [6] , we have considered two particular zero-sum games G 1 , G 2 associated with the initial game G; we have proved that they are uniformlydetermined and studied their complexity for all the classical payoffs (see Table 3 ). These results are very interesting on their own right, and to the best of our knowledge, were not studied in the literature, except for a variant of the InfMP payoff studied in [2] . For InfMP payoff, our proofs were inspired by techniques developed in [2, 23] , however with far from trivial adaptations.
Independently of our paper, in [21] , the authors give general hypotheses on multi-player weighted games that guarantee the existence of a secure equilibrium. These hypotheses are satisfied by the weighted games studied in this paper with LimInf, LimSup, Inf, Sup and Disc λ payoffs (but not with InfMP and SupMP payoffs). Thus for these payoffs, Problem 1 is also positively solved thanks to the results proved in [21] (however with no indication about the existence of a secure equilibrium that is finite-memory).
